IN CONVERSATION: "We do not have preferred Cambodian politicians"
Igor Driesmans, the EU's ambassador to Phnom Penh, speaks about reapprochment with Cambodia, shared climate action, Cambodia's trade previlidges, and the deterioation of democracy.
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Europe’s relationship with Cambodia is changing. After several years of the EU condemning Phnom Penh for democratic backsliding, including the forced dissolution of the country’s largest opposition party, the imprisonment of leading politicians, and the eradication of a once free and rumbustious civil society, the EU imposed partial trade sanctions in 2020, cutting a number of trade privileges Cambodia enjoyed under the preferential Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. Diplomacy was scaled back. Aid was slower in arriving. However, since 2022—when Cambodia held the ASEAN chairmanship for that year and, to many people’s surprise, vocally backed Ukraine against Russia’s invasion—relations have warmed. Hun Sen, the former prime minister and father of the current PM, made an important visit to Paris in late 2022, which one might say was the real start of the Europe-Cambodia rapprochement. For many analysts, including myself, the once-in-a-generation handover of power in Cambodia last year, when almost the entire older generation of Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) leaders resigned and handed down power to the younger generation (mostly their own children), presented a reset moment for the EU and the West. Hun Manet, the new prime minister, pledged a more Western-looking, technocratic and clean (although not democratic) government, while his own temperament—Western-educated, English-speaking and self-confident amongst business circles—has added to the promise of reform.
Earlier this month, I spoke to Igor Driesmans, the EU’s ambassador to Phnom Penh since last year, about the ongoing changes in EU-Cambodia relations. I hope you enjoy…
Jutta Urpilainen, European Commissioner for International Partnerships, wrapped up her visit to Cambodia last month, at which new programmes worth $85.6 million were announced. On the back of Prime Minister Hun Manet’s visit to France and Foreign Minister Sok Chenda Sophea’s engagement in EU-ASEAN events in January, as well as your own engagement with the Cambodian government, should this be interpreted as the EU’s renormalisation of ties and rapprochement with Cambodia after a period of tense relations between 2017 and 2023? If so, was the change of government last year the primary factor?
In any relation – diplomatic or otherwise – there are areas of disagreements and areas of areas of agreement. The reduction of civic and political space in Cambodia has indeed been an issue on which we have not seen eye to eye. But we have always discussed these issues openly and constructively with the Cambodian government over the last years, for example, when HRVP Borrell met with PM Hun Sen in 2022 or when Commissioner Urpilainen met with PM Hun Manet last month. I have also discussed these issues in some detail during my calls on the Prime Minister and on different ministers.
At the same time, there are many areas on which our interests and views converge. We share, for example, Cambodia’s ambition to deepen integration in ASEAN, to graduate towards a middle income country, to reform the economy attracting different sources of investment and to transition towards a greener economy by increasing the share of renewable energy.
The visit of Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen was a good opportunity to engage the new government on all of these issues. And the upcoming EU-Cambodia Joint Committee in the second half of April will be another opportunity to deepen that conversation.
Cambodia has emerged as one of the most active countries in Southeast Asia on renewable energy production and climate action. How integral is climate cooperation to EU-Cambodia relations and what role can the EU play in Cambodia on this matter?
Climate cooperation is already integral to EU-Cambodia relations, and in fact one of the most important one in our bilateral relation. Tackling climate change and a just green transition is a major global priority for the EU, and Cambodia is no exception to it. We are currently providing financial assistance to Cambodia for climate change initiatives, including grid modernisation, renewable energy projects and green transition efforts (eg. energy efficiency). We also support the country through technical education in developing the necessary skills and knowledge to address some of the challenges of the green transition. And it’s not only specific green projects: fostering sustainable development and environmental protection are mainstreamed in all of our cooperation programmes, in whatever domain. Cambodia clearly has many challenges ahead in this area, but we see the openness of the new Government on this as a very welcome sign.
How important has Cambodia’s support for Ukraine been to EU engagement with Phnom Penh? It was clearly a factor when Cambodia held the ASEAN chair in 2022, and, I believe, in a recent debate, you referenced Cambodia’s support for de-mining efforts in Ukraine.
Cambodia has indeed taken a principled position on the Russian invasion in Ukraine. They have been on the side of international law and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty as a basic tenet of international relations. Cambodia has done so in different statements but also at various UN votes. Cambodia has also been actively demining and training Ukrainian de-miners. Cambodia has understood that “might does not make right” and that the only way to manage international relations is by respecting basic rules. This is indeed a view shared by Cambodia and the EU, but also, I would say, an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly.
One of the biggest issues moving forward is Cambodia’s transition out of its Least Developed Countries (LDC) status. This will mean it loses its EBA status. Jutta Urpilainen said last week that Brussels is ready to discuss Camboidia’s access to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) scheme. Can you provide some updates on this? What will access to GSP+ entail for Cambodia? What will Cambodia have to do to get access? And what timeframe are we looking at?
Indeed, when a country graduates from the LDC status, a 3 year transit period starts, at the end of which the country automatically moves to the GSP trade regime. A country can also ask for what we call in our system GSP+, which is a more advantageous trade regime, cutting import duties to zero on more than 66% of the tariff lines. For GSP+ to be granted, any country will have to implement a number of international conventions, 27 to be precise, including on human rights, good governance, labour rights and the environment. In this sense, GSP+ requirements are quite similar to those of EBA. Regarding the timeframe – if the UN approves Cambodia’s request to postpone its LDC graduation to 2029 – then we are looking at the EBA running until 2032.
A big story of the past year or two has been the vast scamming industry in Cambodia, as well as the slave-like condition and human trafficking involved. Obviously, China is most engaged in this issue, since many of the scam compounds are Chinese-run and the scammers are targeting Chinese nationals. But what has been EU engagement on this problem? Is there much the EU can do to either assist Cambodian law enforcement efforts or assist victims of this illicit industry? Also, does the EU have a duty to demand more accountability from the Cambodian authorities in tackling this problem?
We have been monitoring closely the criminality surround the scamming industry, which is a major issue in many Southeast Asian countries. This industry – if you can even call it like that - is what you could call a pluri-criminal enterprise, involving human trafficking trafficking, money-laundering, cybercrime and corruption, all being inter-linked and serving the same criminal networks.
I have raised this issue in several meetings and we will be raising it in the upcoming EU-Cambodia Joint Committee as well as at various upcoming UN human rights meetings where Cambodia will be on the agenda (UPR review, HRC). We are also cooperating with the UN, notably the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, who is doing an excellent job in raising awareness, sharing information and offering a pathway to deal with this kind of criminality.
We are, of course, concerned about the increase of the scamming and related activities which is not only a horror for the people trapped in it and the people defrauded abroad, but it is also affecting the broader investment climate.
When the EU partially revoked Cambodia’s EBA privileges, Brussels stated goals were for the reinstatement of the CNRP, the release of Kem Sokha and the restoration of democracy. These have not happened. First, does the EU believe these goals are still possible? Second, there are allegations that the EU has toned down its rhetoric on human rights and democracy in Cambodia, preferring instead to focus on supporting the more realistic judicial and administrative reform that Hun Manet has promised to conduct. What do you say to this?
Contrary to what some might believe, we do not take sides in internal politics. We have no preferred political parties or politicians. What we have said – and what will continue to say – is that we are in favour a multi-party democracy, a well-functioning judicial system, media freedom and a vibrant civil society. In that sense, we continue to call for the release of Kem Sokha and other jailed opposition leaders. We regret that important sectors of the opposition, due to criminal convictions of political leaders and the disqualification of the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, have not been able to register for the general elections and are still excluded from political life. The EU is firmly convinced that a true multi-party democracy enables a healthy and free exchange of ideas and policies that bring our societies forward. Defending these principles, and the human rights connected to them, is not only the treaty obligation of the EU but also our mere DNA.
Hun Sen will soon return to frontline politics as Senate president, so acting head of state in the King’s absence. Will this have any impact on EU engagement in Cambodia? Do you still expect most diplomatic efforts to go through Hun Manet and his ministers?
As said, we do not have preferred Cambodian politicians. As a diplomatic mission, our prime interlocutor is the executive branch. But is also our duty to engage with all branches of government, which includes the two houses of the parliament, as well as with representatives from society at large.