ANALYSIS: Europe and Myanmar’s Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)

Engagement exists...

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— I WANTED TO WRITE (QUITE) A FEW WORDS one of the more opaque issues of Europe’s role in the ongoing Myanmar conflict—engagement, or alleged lack of it, with the numerous ethnic armed organisations (EAOS), or ethnic resistance organisations (EROs) as some people are now calling them. For the think-tank I’m attached to, I’m working on quite a lengthy policy report about Europe’s future policies on Myanmar but I keep coming up against the problem of hardly any public information on what sort of engagement the EU currently has with Myanmar’s EAOs. This analysis far from reveals the degree and intricacies of that engagement, but I wanted to relay some of the conversations I’ve had with sources on this matter over the past week or so.

A few words on the EAOs, to start, and excuse imprecision for brevity. The EAOs have been a factor in Myanmar politics for decades, most challenging the national government for greater autonomy of their ethnic region or, for some, full-blown independence. Many are the de facto rulers of their respective areas. And they have been the driving forces of the upturn in anti-junta victories since late last year. The Three Brotherhood Alliance (the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army) spearheaded the assault through its Offensive 1027, launched last October. Here’s a rather good segment on the offensive produced a few months ago:

According to a recent report, which provides a concise summary of the EAOs, there are more than 25 armed factions currently operating, although some of these are mergers in name only. Since the 2022 coup, many of them have fought alongside the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), very loosely the National Unity Government’s military wing, although the PDFs are also rather disparate and far from monolithic. The NUG is said to actually have little sway over their day-to-day activity, especially over the EAOs, but while major tensions persist among the EAOs, the NUG and PDFs, these disputes are being set aside (for now) for the common goal of ending the military junta. Mike Walker, of Brookings, put it in January: “[T]he mutual support between the NUG and the most powerful EAOs is critical to maintaining pressure on the junta. Yet, even within this construct, some EAOs view the ongoing conflict as an opportunity to expand their territory and influence versus an altruistic struggle for democracy.” And an interesting (and lengthy) report from last year put it thusly: 

On one hand, some EAOs – particularly those close to Myanmar’s borders with Thailand and India – are vocal supporters of the NUG. These EAOs have provided military training to former protesters and launched joint attacks against SAC targets. The NUG and its EAO allies have also formed joint command structures to coordinate their military operations, which are becoming increasingly cohesive as a result. Other EAOs, located near the Myanmar–Bangladesh and Myanmar–China borders, are more equivocal towards the NUG, although they largely oppose the coup. 

My NUG sources constantly refute the allegations of EAO disloyalty. Many of the more important ethnic groups are solidly behind the NUG’s plans for a federal democratic state, and some are part of the NUG’s administrative framework, such as the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the NUG’s advisory body. Members include the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the political wing of the Karenni Army; the Karen National Union, the political wing of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); and the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF). The NUCC is also composed of several Consultative Councils or Coordination Committees, such as the Interim Chin National Consultative Council, which was set up by the Chin National Front, the political wing of the Chin National Army. The political and military wings of these groups are rarely separate.

SO, THE SITUATION IS COMPLEX. And this complexity is probably one reason why the international community is so averse to intervening in Myanmar. It’s far from the black-and-white, good and evil, story of the Ukraine War. However, there appears to be some degree of confusion around the EU and EAOs. Talk to some European experts on Myanmar and the picture they paint is almost no EU/European engagement with those ethnic groups. But that’s not the way European officials present it.

“The EU has regular contacts with most EAOs,” an EU diplomatic source told me. The only two “relevant” ones that the EU doesn’t have contacts with, I’m informed, are the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), which is based in Kokang region and which was one of the first to sign a government ceasefire in the 2000s, and the United Wa State Army, one of the best-equipped EAOs and which de-facto rules Wa State through its political wing, the United Wa State Party. The source added: 

We definitely do engage EAOs as much as we engage with NUG and we do it quite regularly. We consider this a major component of our work. We meet them online, in Bangkok and in Chiang Mai. They receive support through some projects and some humanitarian and development entities associated with them as public service providers do receive financial assistance through the EU. Our direct support to them is not, of course, in terms of supporting their military activities—we have an arms embargo in place in Myanmar—but in terms of peace processes (preparation). We also regularly discuss political developments with them to understand to what extent the situation is evolving both on the ground but also in terms of their relationship with other stakeholders….They are and will remain key stakeholders of any post-conflict situation.”

And Peter Stano, an EU spokesperson, told me:

The EU does indeed maintain dialogue with many EAOs in Myanmar. This engagement aims to promote peace, human rights, and a return to democracy in the country. The EU believes that an inclusive peace process requires participation from all stakeholders, including ethnic groups. There are varying degrees of engagement with different EAOs. Historically, engagement with groups committed to the ceasefire process [in the 2010s] was a priority for the EU. Our dialogue varies also based on the commitment displayed by the EAOs in implementing human rights. The EU remains committed to supporting a peaceful and democratic future for Myanmar. We believe that inclusive dialogue involving all stakeholders, including EAOs, is essential to achieving this goal.

A source in the Myanmar resistance movement says that European actors are specifically in touch with the Karen National Union (KNU), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. That source also tells me that some ethnic leaders were present at the Munich Security Conference last year, where NUG Foreign Affairs Minister Zin Mar Aung gave a speech. The NUG and some EAO representatives (I’m led to believe from the Karen, Chin and Karenni groups) participated in the Forum 2000 conference in Prague last October, which was also attended by the highest-ranking Czech politicians. Afterwards, the Myanmar groups published the so-called Prague Appeal, in which, amongst other things, they called on the EU and European governments to “recognize NUG and evolving state governments as Myanmar’s legitimate governments and other revolutionary forces as democratic institutions.” However, the same source reckons that the EU and European governments are still are little afraid of public engagement with the EAOs since some are associated with the narcotics trade, and there are still doubts about the commitment of some to a democratic Myanmar after the junta falls. And, for the most part, the EU appears to be conducting much of its engagement with the EAOs through the NUG, which is a sensible policy. 

Indeed, a Burmese source with knowledge of these matters said that some EU countries “have unofficial or semi-official engagement with some EAOs concerning humanitarian aid or other kinds of support, but it is necessary to have proper coordination among the whole democratic movement”. They added: 

Since we claim the de jure legitimacy of CRPH and NUG, we should include them in all discussions. Communicating only with the de facto defence leaders on the ground might create a misunderstanding of democracy and cause even more splits in the movement. A mediation between CRPH, NUG, NUCC and EAOs might be very helpful so that the democracy movement will be more united and the international community’s engagement will not be selective.

As I said at the beginning, this isn’t an exhaustive analysis, and it probably raises as many questions as it answers, but this is certainly an issue that needs further research.