“The EU is ready to seize the future opportunities to engage with the US on ASEAN matters,” says EU ambassador to ASEAN

Igor Driesmans, head of EU Mission to ASEAN, discusses Europe’s visibility deficit in Southeast Asia, palm-oil disputes, free-trade deals and the promise of working with the Joe Biden administration

Each week, I’ll be bringing you unfiltered, in-depth Q&As with experts, politicians and thinkers on the future and history of European relations with Southeast Asia.

To start the show, I spoke with the EU ambassador to ASEAN, Igor Driesmans, to find out more about the multilateral dealings between the two blocs.

Key Comments

• “There are fundamental differences between the EU and ASEAN but we both aim to develop collective responses to common challenges through cooperative mechanisms.”

• “Let me stress though that the EU is not “anti-palm oil”. The EU has lower tariffs on palm oil than any other major partner. It is also noteworthy that palm oil imports from Indonesia and Malaysia into the European market have increase by 40% in the first half of this year as compared to last year.”

• “We are the only partner of ASEAN who has a regular human rights dialogue and we find more common ground than is sometimes thought.”

• “I agree that we have a visibility deficit. That is not an issue exclusive to this region. It is hard enough already to get people to write and read about the EU and EU policies within Europe.”

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We now know that Joe Biden will become the next US president in January. Will a Biden presidency affect EU policy in Southeast Asia, and will the renewed interest in multilateralism that Biden is expected to instill potentially allow the EU and US to engage in more coordinated policy in the region, especially on issues like human rights and the environment?

It is probably too early to tell what would be US policies towards Southeast Asia under the new administration. We can reasonably assume that there will be more emphasis on multilateralism, including opening renewed opportunities for cooperation in the ASEAN context. Areas of mutual interest are indeed numerous from vaccine security, connectivity, trade, climate change, to the fight against terrorism, maritime security and the maintenance of the international-rules based order. Throughout the years, EU-US cooperation and dialogue never stopped. The EU and US have held regular policy dialogue on East Asia and on their respective initiatives towards Asia.

For the EU, the US is our most important ally and partner for historical and economic reasons. We have a long history of working together based on shared values. With the new US leadership, the EU is ready to seize the future opportunities to engage with the US on ASEAN matters.

Would it be too quick to say that of the four Southeast Asian states the EU has started free-trade negotiations with, Thailand is the most likely candidate to secure the EU’s third FTA with a Southeast Asian state  – given talks with Malaysia and Indonesia won’t progress unless a solution is found to the palm-oil dispute and some in the European Parliament are vocally opposed to a FTA with the Philippines over human rights abuses? Also, it is now all but certain that a EU-ASEAN free-trade agreement is off the table?

In June we touched base with Thailand on prospects for a resumption of negotiations on an ambitious and comprehensive FTA. This is an objective the EU remains interested in, if we are on the same page in terms of level of ambition, both on scope and on content, including with regard to opening up the Thai services, investment and procurement markets. We both need to ensure that if negotiations resume we would be able to deliver on our respective constituencies’ expectations.

The EU is deeply engaged and committed to the region and views prosperity in ASEAN as its shared prosperity. We have developed an active bilateral agenda with some ASEAN member states and two bilateral FTAs are now in force while we negotiate others. I believe it is important to be more specific on the level of ambition and areas to be covered, and include details on key principles for certain elements to allow us to guide future negotiations. Experts would need to further their work and should not shy away from areas that seem difficult or areas where there is not yet an ASEAN position. 

On that subject, could you provide any updates about the progress of the disputes between Indonesia and the EU over Brussels plans to phase out palm-oil imports? Has the EU drawn a line in the sand over this issue or is there the possibility of negotiating a compromise with Indonesia and Malaysia?

First, let me clarify: palm oil is a bilateral issue, not an ASEAN issue.

Discussions are ongoing with the interested parties with a view to find common ground, but I am not in the position to give any details. Our objective is to encourage a constructive engagement on palm oil via a working group as agreed at the January 2019 EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Indeed we remain committed to a constructive dialogue and engagement on sustainable production of palm oil.

Let me stress though that the EU is not “anti-palm oil”. The EU has lower tariffs on palm oil than any other major partner. It is also noteworthy that palm oil imports from Indonesia and Malaysia into the European market have increase by 40% in the first half of this year as compared to last year. The focus of the Renewable Directive II has been on the sustainability of our biofuels regime. And we are currently starting the consultations for its review.

Last month, a minor furore was sparked after Bilahari Kausikan, a former permanent secretary of Singapore’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, suggested that Cambodia and Laos may have to be removed from the ASEAN bloc because of their close co-operation with China. What is the EU’s stance now that it appears fissures are opening up within ASEAN bloc over issues of member states’ foreign policy, and do you believe that the so-called “ASEAN Way” of putting national interests first is sustainable in the long-term, given tensions between the US and China?

I will not comment on a particular op-ed. More generally, it is always healthy to see a good level of debate within ASEAN. It shows that civil society in ASEAN is vibrant, engaged and interested in its developments. ASEAN, just like the EU, is composed of countries with different historical and socio-economic backgrounds. It is, I would say, normal that internal debates take place on various issues.

The “ASEAN way”, as I understand it, is more about a process of consultation with a view to find a common denominator for collective action. And ASEAN can claim it has been very successful and consistent in pursuing its own way, in line with the region’s own specificities and diplomatic tradition.

There are fundamental differences between the EU and ASEAN but we both aim to develop collective responses to common challenges through cooperative mechanisms. In that sense, today we face a similar challenge: the rise of power politics and “might” over “right”. It is therefore, more than ever, important to continue working together on promoting our partnership based on cooperative mechanisms and international law.

For the EU, ASEAN’s “centrality” is paramount and we consider ASEAN as a group to be of strategic significance in a world increasingly subjected to power competition. As President Michel said at the ASEAN Business Summit on Friday “A strong ASEAN is squarely in the interest of the EU; it provides stability for the region (..) and is a like-minded partner for multilateralism.”

Throughout the years, ASEAN has demonstrated its resilience and its ability to address new challenges, not least this year with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It was obviously a major challenge and affected all of us at different levels. The COVID crisis is a colossal, global shock unlike any other in recent history.

ASEAN governments have acted in a responsive manner, mitigating as much as possible the effects of this crisis on their population. Clearly, ASEAN countries drew the right conclusions from the SARS outbreak in 2002 and were better prepared than others. ASEAN has shown a real willingness to come together and find regional solutions to address the crisis. Mid-April, ASEAN leaders decided to cooperate on health and research, provide consular assistance, maintain supply chains and stimulate the recovery. This was the right message at the right time, and showed that ASEAN cooperative mechanisms are working.

Last year, the EU branded China a “systemic rival” and in 2020 we have seen a noticeable pivot amongst European politicians towards greater confrontation with China on many issues. At the same time, we have seen US policy in Southeast Asia shift towards open competition with Beijing, oftentimes mediating its policy in the region so as not to “lose” any regional state to Beijing. Does the EU share the geopolitical opinion that by criticising a Southeast Asia state too forcefully on democracy or human rights issues, for instance, it could push it closer into China’s orbit? And, given the EU’s ambitions to play a more active role in Southeast Asia affairs, is it realistic that the EU can maintain neutrality in this superpower rivalry?

The EU’s approach towards China was set out in a Strategy adopted in 2016 and updated in March 2019 in a Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative. The balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted over time. For the EU, China is simultaneously (in different policy areas) a cooperation partner, a negotiation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. This illustrates a complex and multifaceted relationship. The EU pursues a realistic, effective and coherent engagement with China, based on our values and interests. With the US, we obviously have a very different relationship, as I explained earlier.

It is clear that tensions between the US and China are on the rise with clashes over a variety of issues. Positions are hardening and decoupling is becoming a reality in several areas. Within this context of increasing US-China rivalry, we – as the EU – should follow our own approach. This does not mean that we are equidistant from those two protagonists, but that our point of departure is the EU’s own interests and values. 

Support for human rights and democracy is one of these principles, which is at the core of our policy worldwide. And that needs not to be controversial. ASEAN has its own Human Rights Declaration and its own institution with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. As a matter of fact, we are the only partner of ASEAN who has a regular human rights dialogue and we find more common ground than is sometimes thought. Obviously there are disagreements with some ASEAN countries but the main thing is to talk about them constructively and candidly.

According to the latest State of Southeast Asia survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the EU was the second-most trusted outside actor to provide strong leadership in championing the global free trade agenda, just after Japan, and the EU was the most respected for its leadership in maintaining the “rules-based order and upholding international law”. However, the percentage of respondents who thought the EU was the most influential economic power in the region dropped to just 0.6%, down from 1.7% in the previous year’s survey. As for the most political and strategic influence, scores for the EU rose from 0.7% in 2019 to 1.1% in 2020, yet again this was behind Japan. Clearly, there is a good deal of faith in the EU’s principles but not so much in terms of present-day engagement in the region. Is this a problem with how the EU brands or publicises its activity in Southeast Asia? Does the EU have the ambitions to be considered a major economic and political influence in the region? And what more can the EU do to build trust in its engagement, not just its principles?

You are pointing to a key issue. We have indeed a very deep partnership. Our economic presence is massive, as the EU’s private sector holds a quarter of the total FDI stock in the region. We are also the most comprehensive partner – with technical dialogues in over 20 areas – and the largest cooperation partner of ASEAN – with financial support unsurpassed by any other player. And we are – I dare say – ASEAN’s most ardent ally in pushing for ASEAN Centrality.

Our COVID-19 response exemplifies well the depth of our partnership. On 20 March, the EU was the second partner of ASEAN to hold a dedicated EU-ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on COVID-19. That was the beginning of a very intense cooperation, starting with exchanges of information and best practices. Quickly thereafter, in a collective “Team Europe” approach, the EU and its Member-States mobilised over EUR 800mio to support health systems and economic recovery in ASEAN. We also offered ASEAN research organisations to team up with EU scientific projects on COVID-19, including on protective equipment, improving modelling of the spread of the virus and rapid diagnostics techniques. Finally, we work together on the economic front, addressing for example the gaps in supply chains which appeared.

In the immediate future, we will continue working closely with ASEAN on the post-pandemic recovery. Vaccine security will be key. As always, we choose a multilateral, cooperative approach and the European Union is mobilising up to EUR 500mio in guarantees to support COVAX, the global facility for universal and fair access to COVID19 vaccines. That is more than all East Asia Summit members contribute collectively. We will put our expertise and resources at work with COVAX to accelerate and scale-up development and manufacturing of a global supply of vaccines for citizens across the world, in poor and rich countries.

To sum up - reliability, consistency, solidarity and a long-term commitment to the region are the cornerstones of our approach. And ASEAN countries know and appreciate this approach.

At the same time, I agree that we have a visibility deficit. That is not an issue exclusive to this region. It is hard enough already to get people to write and read about the EU and EU policies within Europe. Here in South-East Asia, there is a natural focus on China and the US, even though as I explained earlier on, our partnership with ASEAN is often deeper. So we are aware of this issue and are actively working on it, as we try to systematically improve our visibility across the region. It is easier said than done, but we keep working